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Research Note 
Classifying Ecuador’s Regime under  
Correa: A Procedural Approach 
Omar Sanchez-Sibony 
Abstract: This article presents the case for steering clear of electoral 
outcome-based regime classifications. It advocates focusing instead on 
the systemic character of the formal and informal institutions that gov-
ern access to power as a more appropriate way to draw electoral regime 
boundaries. The case study of Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael 
Correa is offered as an example of this approach. Both electoral out-
comes under Correísmo (2006–2017) as well as the procedural context in 
which elections occurred are examined. But the regime is here analyzed 
and categorized on a procedural-centered basis. The analysis of the slope 
of the playing field in the electoral arena reveals that political competi-
tion was fundamentally unfair, placing the regime in the competitive 
authoritarian category. This conclusion is reached on grounds of the 
incumbent’s capture of the electoral management body, as well as highly 
discriminatory electoral laws drawn by the incumbent, among many 
other factors that rendered Ecuadorean electoral contests unfair.  
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Escúcheme bien, eh! El Presidente de la República no es sólo jefe del Poder 
Ejecutivo, es jefe de todo el estado ecuatoriano. Y el estado ecuatoriano es Po-
der Ejecutivo, Poder Legislativo, Poder Electoral, Poder de Transparencia y 
Control Social, Superintendencias, Contraloría, Procuraduría […] Todo eso 
es el Estado ecuatoriano. 
President Rafael Correa 
1 Introduction: On the Inadequacy of  
Outcome-Based Regime Taxonomies 
It is widely acknowledged among scholars of comparative politics that 
the definitional boundaries delimiting regime categories are somewhat 
ambiguous. In the quest to reduce such ambiguity, comparativists should 
avoid the temptation to craft or rely on regime taxonomies centered on 
electoral outcomes (percentage of votes or seats won, number of elec-
tions won, one-party dominance, alternation of power, etc.). Adam 
Przeworski (1991) famously proposed an outcome-based definition of 
democracy as a regime in which “parties lose elections.” As an easily 
observable indicator, this is an enticing shortcut to delineate the bounda-
ry between democratic and non-democratic polities, and is therefore a 
frequently used definition. However, results-oriented approaches prove 
inadequate from both a conceptual and an empirical standpoint. In con-
ceptual terms, a venerable tradition of scholarship, dating back to Joseph 
Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, defines democracy as a rule-based system 
of governance that derives legitimacy precisely from acceptance of its 
rules (rational-legal legitimacy). For the purpose of classifying electoral 
regimes, faithfulness to a process-centered definition (minimalist or mid-
range) that revolves around access to power dictates a strict focus on the 
procedural conditions surrounding political competition.  
From an empirical point of view, a results-centered approach is in-
adequate because electoral outcomes are, by definition, contingent, and 
because many election outcomes are the product of a mixture of genuine 
voter preferences and governmental manipulation (often practiced on a 
continuous basis between elections). Electoral results can be a certifiably 
misleading or imperfect proxy to judge the fairness, freedom, or ex ante 
competitiveness potential of elections. An undemocratic regime that 
allows competition can lose a notoriously unfree and unfair (pro-
incumbent tilted) election when it becomes highly unpopular. Converse-
ly, electoral outcomes can be competitive but deviate from real (unob-
served) popular preferences because minimum conditions of freedom 
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and fairness do not apply. In short, electoral outcomes are a poor basis 
for inferring the quality of competition. Over-time electoral results that 
are repeatedly one-sided can provide important supplemental infor-
mation about the nature of a regime, but should not be the basis upon 
which categorizations are drawn.  
To underscore their inappropriateness for classificatory purposes, it 
is important to note that electoral-outcome approaches are vulnerable to 
both type-I errors (excluding from democracies regimes that are in fact 
democratic) and type-II errors (including as democracies regimes are that 
are not in fact democratic). Defining democracy as the “institutionaliza-
tion of uncertainty” (Pzreworski 1991) is evocative, but analytically im-
precise and outdated in a post-Cold War era in which many regimes 
concurrently display frequent violations of civil liberties, very uneven 
playing fields, and uncertainty with respect to electoral outcomes (includ-
ing instances of incumbent turnover). Empirically, significant electoral 
uncertainty and authoritarianism do coexist. Therefore, while the alterna-
tion rule may be a point of reference, it is an inadequate basis for coding 
regimes.  
A broader problem with extant classificatory schemes is the viola-
tion of a basic norm of taxonomies: consistent rules. Some political re-
gimes are currently defined by ex-ante attributes and others are not. 
Boundaries separating electoral regimes (electoral democracy versus 
competitive authoritarianism; competitive versus hegemonic electoral 
authoritarianism) are best delineated by examining the broad procedural 
context in which elections (and competition writ large) are embedded; 
this, in turn, certainly poses difficult measurement quandaries. Empirical-
ly speaking, when is an election meaningfully free and fair? When is there 
meaningful competition? Answers to such queries cannot be reliably 
inferred from electoral outcomes, and therefore neither can regime cate-
gorizations. However, paths forward are being charted.  
For example, Hyde and Marinov (2012) have usefully devised data 
that measures electoral competition (that is, which elections can be lost) 
without relying on electoral outcomes or inferring the possibility of 
competition from aggregate measures of regime type. This research 
agenda provides clear criteria to separate competitive regimes from those 
that are not (hegemonic authoritarian). On the conceptual front, a great 
deal of energy has been devoted to devising diminished subtypes of both 
authoritarianism and democracy, but not to the relationship between the 
subtypes of both root concepts. Bogaards (2009) proposes a double-root 
strategy that maps the full range of contemporary regimes from both 
sides of the regime continuum spectrum. Only then can hybrid regime 
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categories be mutually exclusive. It is clear that significant conceptual 
and methodological work remains to be done in order to reduce the 
ambiguities that currently bedevil hybrid categories, but such work is 
underway (for a configurative approach, see Gilbert and Mohseni 2011).  
Despite their inadequacies, outcome-based assessments of regimes 
are common. In the context of Latin America, many analysts and schol-
ars have proclaimed the democratic nature of regimes of highly ques-
tionable democratic credentials by reference to competitive electoral 
results or to outright electoral victories by an opposition (for example, 
Venezuela’s 2008 referendum and 2015 parliamentary election, or Boliv-
ia’s 2016 national referendum). Scrutinizing the processes, rules, and 
informal institutions that condition elections and political contestation is 
surely a much more information-laden, analytically demanding exercise. 
That is why a frequent source of regime misclassification emanates from 
either neglect or unsystematic consideration of the fairness of political 
competition. The concept of competitive authoritarianism, notwithstand-
ing the criticisms it has attracted, has the virtue of defining an authoritar-
ian subtype on the basis of procedural conditions (formal and informal) 
that affect access to power.  
The accurate classification of regimes is of evident significance for 
the enterprise of comparative politics, where analytical precision is of the 
essence, not least to avoid conceptual stretching. Secondly, causal argu-
ments and conclusions emanating from academic works that are prem-
ised on misclassified regimes will inevitably be biased. Thirdly, pervasive 
misclassification of regimes precludes new, important research agendas 
from emerging. If the Latinamericanist community develops a near-
consensus around classifying pink-tide Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, 
and Bolivia as competitive authoritarian, then it will be necessary to re-
think and reassess basic queries about the general state of democratic 
governance in the hemisphere, the legacies of the contestatory left in 
power, or the ability of regional organizations to defend democracy in 
the region – to name just three substantive areas. Also, new questions, 
such as mechanisms of cross-country authoritarian diffusion in a demo-
cratic era, or the effects of party system collapse on the sustainability 
(not merely quality) of democracy, will come to the fore. 
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2 Defining and Characterizing Competitive 
Authoritarianism 
Competitive authoritarian regimes have been defined as those in which 
violations of open, free and fair elections to the executive and the legisla-
ture, as well as violations of civil liberties and political rights, are “broad 
and systematic enough to seriously impede democratic challenges to 
incumbent governments” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53), such that they 
create “an uneven playing field between the government and the opposi-
tion” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53). Delegative democracies are character-
ized by powerful, plebiscitarian executives who are not held to account 
by horizontal institutions, but are still held in check via reasonably free 
and fair elections (O’Donnell 1996). Competitive authoritarian regimes 
dilute vertical accountability (in addition to eviscerating horizontal ac-
countability) because elections are not free and fair. Unequal access to 
financial resources, mass media, the law, and the state apparatus writ 
large, confer the ruling party with a decisive advantage at election time. A 
weapon that is commonly deployed in these regimes is that of discrimi-
natory legalism: the use of formal legal authority to promote government 
cronies and punish critics and opponents (Weyland 2013: 23–25). Com-
petitive authoritarian regimes display incumbent “hyper-advantage” 
(rather than mere incumbent advantage typical of democracies) as a re-
sult of the government’s unmatched access to these resources, rendering 
politico-electoral competition fundamentally unfair.  
However, these hybrid regimes also differ from full-fledged authori-
tarianism in that they evince a legal political opposition, and incumbents 
submit to elections that are competitive, and thus not preordained in 
their final results, even if their unfair nature means that incumbents usu-
ally win. Such contradictory features account for the inherent tensions at 
the heart of competitive authoritarian regimes, for incumbents routinely 
manipulate formal rules of the game to enhance their power, but face 
strong incentives not to eliminate the competitive elements of the re-
gime. As a result, incumbents make great efforts to draw voter support 
during elections and often spearhead permanent forms of campaigning.  
The exposition of evidence employed here follows the framework 
and the conceptual basis laid out by Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010), 
which is premised on the notion that democracy requires a reasonably 
level playing field between the incumbent and the opposition. While 
some deviations from democratic rules and practices are found even in 
established democracies, and illiberal practices are found throughout 
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Latin America, it is the systemic character of political competition that 
needs to be considered.  
3 Why Did Ecuador Transit towards  
Competitive Authoritarianism? 
Scholars have advanced a number of competing explanations for why 
certain chief executives in Latin America are able to concentrate an inor-
dinate amount of power – enough to impede democratic governance. 
Mazzuca (2013) defends the explanatory power of natural resource rents, 
which grant incumbents the ability to co-opt important political actors as 
well as civil society. Rents have also been theorized to stimulate radical-
ism and voluntarist attacks on the established political order. Levitsky 
and Loxton (2013) posit that populism constitutes the chief trigger 
spearheading competitive authoritarian regimes, based on the premise 
that populists enjoy electoral mandates for radical change as well as the 
predisposition and incentives (as outsiders or mavericks) to confront the 
traditional political class and demolish inherited institutions. More gener-
ally, comparativists often adduce institutional factors to explain power-
accretion outcomes. Party system collapse can facilitate the rise of per-
sonalistic outsiders (Madrid 2012) as well as concentration of power in 
the Executive branch, because it removes once-important veto (party) 
players from the political battlefield, rendering a plethora of democratic 
institutions easier to co-opt and capture (Sanchez-Sibony 2013).  
The aforementioned explanatory candidates are not individually at 
odds with one another. They can be collectively summoned to provide a 
rather comprehensive explanation of some recent transitions away from 
democracy in Latin America. Although Rafael Correa’s populist ap-
proach operated as a triggering factor, populism is insufficient to expli-
cate the advent of competitive authoritarianism. Ecuador has seen a 
number of populist chief executives during its post-1978 democratic era 
(De la Torre 2010), yet only Correa was able to successfully construct 
political hegemony. A more complete explanation must incorporate 
permissive conditions. Correa took office in an economic and institu-
tional context that was optimal for authoritarian state-building, a permis-
sive political opportunity structure. On the institutional front, while 
Ecuador’s party system severely dealigned in the 2002 general elections 
that brought outsider Lucio Gutierrez to power, traditional parties be-
came even more marginal and powerless in the 2006 elections that cata-
pulted Rafael Correa to office. The collapse of the traditional party quar-
tet, the flimsy party-voter links of PRIAN and PSP, and the disrepute of 
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democratic institutions writ large, paved the road for a concerted Execu-
tive assault on institutions inherited from the ancient regime. Weakened 
and discredited political parties were no longer able to act as veto players 
against the power-centered ambitions of an astute and very popular in-
cumbent, and nor were Ecuadorean state institutions, which have been 
historically very feeble.  
On the economic front, President Correa presided over a petro-
state blessed by a resource bonanza. The price of oil increased by a 
whopping 81 percent from the time he came to office to the year 2013 – 
touching a record of USD 145 a barrel in July 2008 and standing at a 
high USD 95 a barrel as late as February 2013 (Bloomberg News 2013). 
These high oil prices – as well as tax revenue increases and large loans 
from China – enabled a massive explosion of public expenditure over 
the years, from 26.3 percent of GDP in 2006 to 40.8 percent by 2012 
(Lucio-Paredes 2013), fuelling a formidable clientelistic machine that 
previous presidents could not have bankrolled. Almost two million Ec-
uadoreans came to benefit from the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (monthly 
stipends of USD 35–50) by 2012, up from only one million in 2006. The 
size of the public bureaucracy was expanded from around 100,000 public 
employees in 2007 to roughly 500,000 in 2012 (Lucio-Paredes 2013). The 
new recipients of public jobs and the army of new beneficiaries of the 
bonos had powerful economic incentives to become Correista supporters. 
The massive public investments in health care, education, and infrastruc-
ture (particularly roads and highways), undergirded by the oil bonanza, 
also curried favor with voters.  
Finally, political agency played a role in the erosion of democracy. 
The comparison between Lucio Gutierrez and Correa is useful for eluci-
dating the role of agency (leadership) as an independent explanatory 
factor, because Gutierrez enjoyed almost as favorable an economic and 
institutional environment to concentrate power as did Correa. Despite 
favorable conditions, the army colonel lacked a strategy (and the person-
al craftiness) for power-accretion, as exposed by his meandering deci-
sion-making, or “intermittent populism”: first he collaborated with the 
political establishment, then confronted it after his political capital had 
dissipated (Montúfar 2008). By contrast, Correa’s well-crafted populist 
strategy matched words with deeds, both during the campaign and im-
mediately thereafter. His strategy followed through on a promise of 
wholesale transformation as well as a commitment not to field party 
candidates for parliamentary elections before a Constituent Assembly 
was summoned. Despite facing a similar political opportunity structure, 
the fate of the two populist figures was starkly different. While Gutierrez 
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created a short-lived, self-defeating “authoritarian situation,” to use 
Linz’s term, Correa crafted a self-sustaining authoritarian regime. 
4 Electoral Outcomes under Correísmo  
Rafael Correa sustained high levels of popularity that defied those of 
previous Ecuadorean presidents. His favorable public approval ratings 
were consistently among the very highest in Latin America, reaching a 
superlative 84 percent in in July 2013 and 74 percent in 2014, compared 
with an average of 47 percent for the region, according to Mexico’s Mi-
tofsky polling agency (Consulta Mitofsky 2014). The support for Correa 
was also – unlike that documented for other leftist leaders such as Mo-
rales or Chavez – remarkably similar across socioeconomic sectors 
(Moncagatta 2013). While analyses of Correa’s public support have un-
derstandably focused on legitimacy of performance to explain his inter-
temporal electoral success, this emphasis sidesteps considerations about 
the fairness of electoral contests. Official electoral results after 2006 (that 
is, not including his initial victory) inflate what his support would have 
been under fair conditions for political competition. 
Ecuador has not had an electoral asymmetry of the magnitude seen 
during the Correa era at any time in the post-1979 era. While interna-
tional observers declared all elections during the Correa’s reign to be fair 
and free of fraud, conditions for fair elections had been purposely ma-
nipulated long before each contest. The account provided below is 
meant to provide an important background to the electoral performance 
of Correísmo, not to serve as evidence to categorize the regime. Only if 
the key playing fields of competition are demonstrated to be fundamen-
tally tilted can electoral outcomes be used as supplementary supporting 
evidence for the categorization of a regime as non-democratic, as such 
outcomes will inevitably reflect (to a good extent) incumbent manipula-
tion, regardless of the baseline political capital and performance legitima-
cy enjoyed by the incumbent.  
4.1 Enormous and Unprecedented Margins of  
Victory 
Electoral outcomes in pre-Correa Ecuador stand in stark contrast to 
those that have taken place thereafter. During the 1979–2006 period, the 
margin of victory between the first- and second-placed candidates in the 
first round of a presidential election ranged from 0.89 percent (in 1996) 
to 8.33 percent (in 1998). Ecuador showcased “a high level of competi-
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tiveness in presidential contests” (Freidenberg 2013: 10), not least fos-
tered by perpetual high party system fragmentation, undergirded by a 
playing field that did not confer clear advantages to any given political 
party. Elections were characterized by a high level of uncertainty, a prop-
erty of political competitiveness. Indeed, party turnover in power be-
came the hallmark of Ecuadorean politics, with all major four parties of 
the dominant “party quartet” having at least one turn in power (Sánchez 
2008: 35–66; Pachano 2011: ch. 3). Even though the key 2002 and 2006 
general elections marked the death knell of the traditional party system, 
thereby enhancing the “domain of competition” (due to a higher number 
of floating voters), the margins of victory in the first and second rounds 
of both elections were within the observed range of outcomes in the 
post-1979 era.  
The 2006 presidential contest, which catapulted Correa to the presi-
dency, broadly followed the script of previous elections in terms of 
competitiveness. Correa’s Alianza PAIS (AP) lost the first round by four 
percentage points and won the second round by 13 points (higher than 
average, but only the third-highest margin of victory in the post-1979 
period). The results of the presidential elections of 2009 and 2013 mark 
an obvious departure from previous electoral contests. AP was re-elected 
in both, breaking a historical trend whereby no political party had at-
tained re-election since the return of democracy. Moreover, in both elec-
tions the ruling party attained over 50 percent of the vote in the first 
round, obviating the need for a second round; this outcome was also 
unprecedented. What was even more exceptional was the margin of 
victory between AP and the second-placed party. In 2009, that margin of 
victory was an enormous 23.7 percentage points; in 2013, Correa’s mar-
gin of victory over businessman Guillermo Lasso was a colossal 35 per-
centage points (see Table 1). 
The contrast between electoral outcomes in 2009 and 2013 versus 
those of previous presidential elections (see Table 1) does not provide, 
per se, any proof of a slanted political playing field. However, the dis-
parity is jarring enough to warrant investigation of political competition 
in the electoral arena, as well as all other arenas that have a bearing on 
the fairness of electoral processes. After all, electoral outcomes display-
ing such margins of victory are rare in bona fide democracies.  
Ecuadoreans were summoned to the polls seven times in nation-
wide elections since Correa assumed the presidency in 2006. The ruling 
party won all seven contests. It also won the first post-Correa presiden-
tial election in 2017, in spite of general societal disaffection towards the 
government on multiple fronts (ruling party corruption, economic 
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malperformance, unpopular policy initiatives, botched governmental 
response to a natural disaster, and so on). 
Table 1.  Presidential Election Results, 1979–2017 (Figures in  
Percentages) 
 Candidates First 
Round 
Difference Second 
Round 
Difference 
1979 Roldos Duran-Ballén 
27.7 
23.6 4.1 
68.4 
31.5 36.9 
1984 Febres-Cordero R. Borja 
27.2 
28.3 1.1 
51.5 
48.4 3.1 
1988 R. Borja A. Bucaram 
24.4 
17.6 6.8 
54.0 
46.0 8.0 
1992 S. Duran-Ballén J. Nebot 
31.8 
25.0 6.8 
57.3 
42.6 14.7 
1996 A. Bucaram J. Nebot 
26.2 
27.1 0.9 
54.7 
45.5 9.2 
1998 J. Mahuad A. Noboa 
34.9 
26.6 8.3 
51.1 
48.8 2.3 
2002 L. Gutiérrez A. Noboa 
20.4 
17.3 3.1 
54.3 
45.6 8.7 
2006 A. Noboa  R. Correa  
26.8 
22.8 4.0 
43.3 
56.6 13.3 
2009 R. Correa L. Gutiérrez 
51.9 
28.2 23.7 
Not 
needed 
 
2013 R. Correa G. Lasso 
57.0 
22.0 35.0 
Not 
needed 
 
 
It is a record of invincibility not dissimilar to that seen in Venezuela 
under the competitive authoritarian regime crafted by Hugo Chavez, 
who won 13 out of 14 electoral contests during his 14 years in power. 
Referenda to convoke a Constituent Assembly and ratify the new Magna 
Carta were essentially plebiscites on Correa’s rule, which he won with 
large absolute majorities (see Table 2). Correa’s only narrow victory was 
the surprising outcome of the 2011 referendum proposing changes to 
the judicial branch and mass media.  
Under competitive authoritarian conditions, elections and plebi-
scites can generate regime-subverting effects; in probabilistic terms, 
however, electoral contests usually deliver regime-sustaining outcomes 
(Schedler 2010). Ecuador’s electoral record under Correa fits these 
trends. With the partial exceptions of the 2011 referendum and the 2014 
municipal elections, each time Ecuadoreans were summoned to the poll-
ing station, Correísmo won decisively; on each occasion, the presidential 
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project of enhancing Executive control over state institutions and broad-
ening political power was furthered. 
Table 2. Referenda During Correa’s Era (Figures in Percentages) 
 YES VOTE NO VOTE 
Referendum for convoking Constit-
uent Assembly (15 April 2007) 
82.7 12.4 
Elections to Constituent Assembly: 
Votes for PAIS (30 September 2007)
69.4 
(80 out of 130 seats)
30.6 (other par-
ties) 
Referendum to ratify 2008 Constitu-
tion (28 September 2008) 
63.9 28.1 
2011 Constitutional Referendum (7 
May 2011) 
Question 4 (Judicial Reform: crea-
tion of Magistrates Council) 
Question 5 (Judicial Reform) 
Question 9 (Regulation of Media) 
 
 
46.1 
 
46.6 
44.9 
 
 
42.6 
 
41.9 
42.0 
 
Like other democratically elected leaders in the region who have erected 
authoritarian edifices, Correa astutely used his popularity to conquer 
more and more institutional spaces – including those that help promote 
and keep up his high public approval numbers. When Correa took the 
presidential oath in early 2007, his public approval rating stood at a re-
markable 73 percent (Conaghan 2008). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
whilst democratic institutional power-centers were controlled by opposi-
tion parties, President Correa shifted the political battle against his op-
ponents to the arena where he enjoyed a decided advantage: referenda 
and elections. 
5 Electoral Arena: Unfair Competition 
5.1 Pro-Incumbent Electoral Reforms 
The Ecuadorean political class has experimented with a multitude of 
electoral reforms that “sought to enhance the efficacy of political repre-
sentation” (Sánchez 2008: 110), an objective they signally failed to ac-
complish. By contrast, the reforms to electoral law undertaken during 
Correa’s reign were purely self-aggrandizing in intent. 
The so-called Código de la Democracia (Democracy Code), approved in 
April 2009 (after President Correa vetoed the version enacted by his own 
AP caucus) slanted the electoral playing field. The new legislation al-
lowed serving government officials to run for office without stepping 
down from their posts, granting them extensive media exposure and 
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public resources, a decided advantage not afforded to opposition candi-
dates. The president also vetoed Article 203, which prohibited the use of 
state resources to engage in propaganda and publicity during electoral 
campaigns. Consequently, state resources could now be used legally, 
while the existing prohibition on private media was maintained (Frei-
denberg 2012). Finally, the Código limited private media coverage of can-
didates and political parties during the run-up to elections, banning jour-
nalists from reporting anything favorable or unfavorable about contend-
ers in the 45 days before a vote. State-owned media (effectively tools of 
ruling party propaganda) were not subject to such restrictions. The com-
bination of these features undermined the freedom and fairness of future 
elections.  
Alianza PAIS had obtained 59 seats in the 2009 elections under the 
Hare electoral formula enshrined in the Código de la Democracia for the 
assignment of provincial legislators. In 2012, the Executive branch pi-
loted a change in electoral law from Hare to the majoritarian D’Hondt 
electoral formula, with no aim other than to augment the ruling party’s 
parliamentary dominance, decimating Ecuador’s pluralist political tradi-
tion of favoring the existence of political minorities.1 (The self-serving 
nature of the reform was unmistakable: the D’Hondt method would 
have yielded 75 legislators for AP in the 2009 parliamentary election, 
rather than 59.) In addition, the AP performed extensive gerrymandering 
in the districts of Guayas, Pichincha and Manabi (accounting for over 32 
percent of seats in Congress); this, coupled with the D’Hondt majoritari-
an electoral formula, amounted to an “explosive combination” (Basabe-
Serrano 2013), because it greatly amplified the majoritarian bias of the 
formula, brazenly favoring the ruling party.2 Thus, the government ush-
ered in a de facto super-majoritarian electoral law. With 51.8 percent of 
the vote in the 2013 parliamentary election, AP obtained a vast 73 per-
cent of seats (100 out of 137), well over the two-thirds super-majority 
that permitted the government to enact constitutional changes without 
the support of other parliamentary forces.3 It also allowed the AP to 
                                                 
1  NRW 2012. In 2004, the Constitutional Tribunal declared the D’Hondt elec-
toral method unconstitutional because it discriminated against political minori-
ties. 
2  For illustration, under the new electoral scheme, one ruling AP lawmaker from 
rural Pichincha represents just 80,000 inhabitants – half the population of a dis-
trict in opposition-friendly Northern Quito.  
3  In addition, the pro-government party Avanza gained five seats. The new 
electoral law also exploited the fragmentation of opposition party lists, thus 
augmenting the ruling party’s surplus of seat representation. The 29 seats held 
by the opposition were divided among Movimiento Creando Oportunidades 
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control the presidency and two vice-presidencies of Congress, as well as 
control all 13 parliamentary Commissions. This hegemonic ruling party 
presence in the legislature – unthinkable in bona fide democratic regimes 
– also paved the way for the continued absence of accountability on the 
part of government officials.4  
Both the 2009 and 2012 electoral rule changes entailed a number of 
violations of the 2008 Montecristi Magna Carta, not least the constitu-
tional prohibition (stipulated in Article 117) against changing electoral 
rules within the 12 months previous to an election – which led to the 
convenient postponement of the 2013 general election. Moreover, the 
legislation enshrined in the Código brazenly contravened Articles 115, 
166, and 138 of the Montecristi Constitution, all of which sought to 
safeguard the equity and impartiality of electoral processes (CNE 2008).  
5.2 Capture of the National Electoral Council 
All of the aforementioned Constitutional transgressions were enacted 
with impunity because the government obtained de facto control of the 
judiciary as well as the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Elec-
toral – CNE). In 2011, the naming of five members with links to Alianza 
PAIS to integrate the CNE gave the electoral body a decidedly partisan 
affiliation. All five had worked for the ruling party either in government 
or as parliamentarians. This included CNE President Domingo Paredes, 
a former treasurer of AP, and Vice-president Paul Salazar, a former advi-
sor to Foreign Minister Ricardo Patiño (Expreso 2011). The selection 
process, nominally entrusted to the Consejo de Participación Ciudadana (a 
body the 2008 Constitution created), was plagued with irregularities and 
denounced by the opposition as well as by well-qualified candidates to 
these posts who were unduly discarded (El Universo 2012).  
Predictably, from the time these new members were installed, the 
CNE systematically made rulings favoring the government, which dam-
aged the electoral prospects of the opposition. CNE reforms to prevail-
ing electoral legislation established rural districts of much smaller magni-
tude than urban ones, a rule tailor-made to capitalize on AP’s popularity 
in rural Ecuador. Another such regulation obliged presidential candidates 
                                                                                                    
(CREO) (11), Partido Social Cristiano (6), Sociedad Patriótica (5), Movimiento 
Popular Democratico (MPD)-Pachakutik (5), Partido Rodolsista Ecuatoriano 
(PRE) (1), and Movimiento Sociedad Unida Mas Accion (SUMA) (1). 
4  In the 2009–2013 legislative term, out of the 19 political trials put forth by the 
National Assembly against state officials, only the two promoted by the Execu-
tive prospered, whereas none of the 17 put forth by the opposition did.  
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to personally register their candidacies, a move that targeted Abdalá 
Bucaram and Alvaro Noboa, both exiled from the country and burdened 
with legal troubles that made their return difficult. The CNE was newly 
entrusted with supervising the selection of internal party candidates of all 
contending political formations, a prerogative that was wrested away 
from political parties themselves. Another change in electoral norms 
made any campaign spending undertaken before the official convocation 
to elections count toward the campaign spending limits stipulated in the 
law – a law that was crafted to hamper rich banker and opposition can-
didate Guillermo Lasso, and one from which the President was exempt. 
Opposition parties made numerous complaints to the CNE about the 
abuse of public resources during electoral campaigns on the part of Pres-
ident Correa, but these were systematically ignored by the electoral body 
(CRE Satelital 2013). The CNE also failed to supervise and place con-
straints on the incumbent’s campaign spending. For instance, during the 
2011 Referendum, the CNE accepted Correa’s request that he be ex-
empted from submitting his campaign’s expenditures, as legally required 
of other candidates, on the grounds that that he would not be accepting 
private contributions; this special treatment attracted strong protesta-
tions from the opposition (El Comercio 2011).  
6 Correísmo without Correa? 
At the height of Correa’s power, political scientist Luis Verdesoto stated 
that his challenge was to “create the Ecuadorean version of the Mexican 
PRI, technocratic, despotic and corrupt […] as well as a standardized, 
homogenous society that yields electoral majorities” (El País 2013). That 
party-centered vision never materialized. Correa’s failure to invest in the 
institutionalization of Alianza País (AP) boded ill for the future hegemo-
ny of Correísmo or the building of a long-lived “perfect dictatorship.” 
New parties are most likely to consolidate when they develop a clear 
brand, build territorial organization, and avoid early schisms (Levitsky, 
Loxton, and Van Dyck 2017). Alianza País failed on all three counts. The 
development of a programmatic brand was hindered by the contradicto-
ry elements that make up the official “doctrine,” policy switches on a 
number of issue areas, and worsening economic performance from 2014 
onwards. The ruling party never developed internal mechanisms of dis-
pute resolution to manage the irreconcilable differences among its multi-
ple factions, whose main glue has been their loyalty to the leader. Finally, 
Correa largely utilized control over the mass media and growing state 
control over the economy as substitutes for party organization.  
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In April 2015, the National Assembly approved a constitutional 
change that allowed for indefinite presidential re-election, with a provi-
sional amendment such that the clause only applied from 2021 onwards. 
The rationale behind this manoeuver was open to interpretation; Correa 
possibly aimed to wrong-foot the opposition, evade ownership of the 
looming economic crisis, and play for another day (that is, post-2021). In 
any case, it was hardly irreversible. The Constitutional Court, dominated 
by incumbent party acolytes, had the prerogative to rule the amendment 
unconstitutional, leaving the door open for Correa had he wanted to run 
in 2017 (ABC Internacional 2015). The acute personalization of power 
undergirding the Citizens’ Revolution constituted its greatest vulnerabil-
ity: after a decade in office, the absence of a societally-rooted, institu-
tionalized ruling party meant that Correísmo as a political project was in 
jeopardy without Correa. None of the president’s potential successors 
(Lenin Moreno, Gabriela Rivadeneira or Jorge Glass) enjoyed his level of 
legitimacy or popularity. Once in office Moreno has attained enormous 
popularity due to his anti-corruption efforts, his conciliatory demeanor, 
and other factors. His government represents a departure from Correis-
mo in many respects, a testament to the limits and personalization inher-
ent to Correa’s political project. 
Much like the economic crises of 1980s and 1990s made it difficult 
to govern on the left (Kaufman 2011), so it has proven in the post-
resource bonanza era (2013 onwards), as manifested in recent adverse 
electoral results for Kirchnerismo, the MAS, and Chavismo – all lost 
nationwide elections or referenda in 2015–2016. Oil-funded state spend-
ing constitutes the cornerstone of Correísmo. In August of 2014, Oriente’s 
crude oil blend sold for USD 90 a barrel; by August 2015 it was selling at 
USD 37 (Ecuador Review 2015). After 10 years in office, the Correa regime 
had “not been able to lay the foundations to build a different economy 
better able to withstand unfavorable external conditions” (Ecuador Review 
2015). With the end of the commodity boom, the regime’s performance 
legitimacy suffered visibly. The large-scale protests witnessed throughout 
2015 and 2016 – led by teachers, indigenous groups, environmentalists, 
labor unions and other groups – amid a much-deteriorated economic 
environment, exposed the over-dependence of Correa’s popularity and 
political project upon the vast system of patronage that (temporary) 
windfall gains permitted. Correa’s public approval had dropped from 60 
percent in 2014 to 35 percent by May 2016 (La Hora 2016). In the ab-
sence of institutional avenues to channel demands and grievances, civil 
society protests repeatedly spilled onto the streets, disparate in its (sec-
toral) demands, but united against the government’s authoritarianism. 
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Correísmo as a hegemonic political project was fraying in parallel with 
lower international oil prices. However, a post-hegemonic scenario is not 
tantamount to an imminent transition to democracy. The likelihood of a 
liberalizing electoral outcome in competitive authoritarian regimes, de-
fined as alternation in power or significant liberalization, is greatly en-
hanced by the ability of the opposition to forge a unified coalition 
(Howard and Roessler 2006). In Ecuador, the fragmented political oppo-
sition did not coalesce around that strategic choice. This lack of coordi-
nation contributed to the victory of the incumbent AP in the 2017 presi-
dential election, a contest also beset by an uneven playing field – not 
least, inequality in access to the state and to the law. Lenin Moreno prof-
ited from the advantages bequeathed to the ruling party during the 
course of a decade of institutional engineering and informal forms of 
power-accretion.  
7 Conclusion 
I have argued that, in judging the dividing line between democracies and 
competitive authoritarianism, it is the systemic character of the formal 
and informal procedures that govern and affect access to power that 
merit scrutiny, not electoral outcomes. This essay5 offers evidence of 
incumbent maneuvering that aims to tilt the playing field in the electoral 
arena. Elections in Ecuador have been rendered unfair because of the 
incumbent’s capture of the electoral management body, as well as a 
number of electoral law changes that aim to benefit the incumbent party 
and hamper the opposition. The incumbent party incurred in many other 
forms of calculated maneuvering in the mass media, judiciary, legislature 
and other arenas, all of which inexorably shaped elections. The result of 
this multifaceted self-dealing was the systemically slanted nature of elec-
toral processes. Correa’s charisma and genuine popularity aside, opinion 
polls and official electoral results inescapably reflected the consequences 
of incumbent hyper-advantage in access to mass media and state institu-
tions writ large. For instance, the verifiably more slanted political playing 
field in the 2013 presidential election in comparison to the 2009 contest 
contributed to a less competitive election.  
There are powerful theoretical reasons for scholars to focus on pro-
cedural considerations when drawing the boundary between democratic 
                                                 
5  I would like to thank Francisco Sanchez, Santiago Basabe-Serrano, John Polga, 
William Barndt and James Bowen for their comments on a previous version of 
this article. 
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and nondemocratic regimes. A convergence on process-centered defini-
tions would allow comparativists to hone in on adequate operationaliza-
tions of what a level playing field entails, markedly reducing the room for 
disagreements about the classification of real-world regimes. Discrepan-
cies over definitions of what a democratic regime comprises and where 
its boundaries are have come at a high cost for comparative politics be-
cause they slow knowledge accumulation, bias findings, foment conflict-
ing scholarly results, and prevent new interesting inquiries in the field of 
regime transitions from emerging. 
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Clasificando el Régimen de Correa en Ecuador: Un Enfoque Pro-
cedimental  
Resumen: Este artículo propone evitar categorizar tipos de régimen en 
base a resultados electorales. Por el contrario, aboga por utilizar criterios 
basados en lo procedimental para clasificar regímenes políticos, enfocán-
dose en el carácter sistémico de las instituciones formales e informales 
que gobiernan el acceso al poder. Se ofrece aquí un análisis del régimen 
de Rafael Correa como caso de estudio para ilustrar este enfoque. Se 
examinan los resultados electorales bajo el Correísmo asi como el con-
texto procedimental bajo el cual tuvieron lugar estos resultados. Pero el 
régimen se clasifica en base a criterios de procedimiento. El análisis de la 
arena electoral revela que la competición política entre Correa y la oposi-
ción fue fundamentalmente injusta, lo que sitúa al régimen como uno de 
tipo autoritario competitivo. Se llega a dicha conclusión después de de-
mostrar que la agencia electoral nacional fue capturada por el correísmo 
y fue muy parcial en sus decisiones. También las leyes electorales creadas 
y modificadas fueron muy discriminatorias contra la oposición, entre 
otros muchos factores que inclinaban las elecciones a favor del partido 
de gobierno. 
Palabras clave: Ecuador, Elecciones, Democracia, Autoritarismo Com-
petitivo, Taxonomías de regímenes 
